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Abstract
In this chapter, we examine the effect of ask of Korea’s National Pension Service for higher
dividend on the firm value. There is a conflicting view on the dividend pressure of the
National Pension Service. First, the dividend pressure of the National Pension Service
contributes not only to reducing the agency problem, which is a disadvantage for Korean
companies’ ownership management, but also to reducing the Korea discount, which is a
low dividend. The other hand, it is the so-called pension socialism that National Pension
Service engages in the dividend policy which is the essence of corporate management
with a high stake. This study is conducted on Korean listed companies from 2011 to 2016
and has constructed a test sample using propensity score matching. The results show that
the dividend pressure of National Pension Service doesn’t have a significant effect on the
firm value. This study is expected to provide useful information for pension funds to
exercise voting rights. Also, this study is expected to provide further evidence of a study
that verifies the relationship between dividend and firm value by examining the effect of
external pressures on dividend policy on firm value.
Keywords: National Pension Service, dividend policy, firm value, pension funds, voting
rights
1. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of the demand for higher dividends of Korea’s
National Pension Service (NPS) on firm value. The NPS is one of the top three pension funds in
the world, together with Japan’s public pension fund and Norwegian sovereign fund. At the
same time, it is one of the fastest growing pension funds in the world. The NPS is expected to
grow to $ 1.21 trillion by 2025, from $ 0.54 trillion in the first quarter of 2017. According to the
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investment portfolio of the NPS, the portion of bonds invested in the first quarter of 2017 is
53.3% and the share of equity investments is 35.1%. Domestic equity investment accounted for
19.6% of total assets, and it reaches about 6.83% of the total amount. As of the second quarter
of 2017, the NPS is the largest or the second largest shareholder of Korea’s major conglomer-
ates, including Samsung Electronics, Naver, and Hyundai Motor, and has more than 5% stake
in more than 20% of the top 10 listed companies.
As the funding of the NPS grows, the returns of the pension funds become more important.
This is because the yield of the national pension is linked to the welfare level of the people and
the old age. As the low interest rate policy and the low growth trend have prolonged since the
financial crisis, the NPS has been steadily demanding to increase the dividend to major
domestic corporations in order to improve the pension management profit rate. Moreover, as
the Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Law was revised at the end of 2014 in Korea,
NPS could demand dividends from invested companies even if the purpose of holding them is
not management participation. This means that the government has provided legal grounds
for the NPS to ask domestic companies to increase their dividends. In addition, the govern-
ment has also encouraged companies to increase their dividends by introducing corporate
taxation system for reserves for a limited period starting from 2014 in order to increase
household incomes and stimulate investment of companies.
Although the dividend payout ratio and dividend ratio still do not reach the global level, cash
dividends of Korean companies have increased sharply since 2014. The increase in dividend
size is attributed to the increased demand from shareholders for dividends, including the NPS,
and the government’s policy to increase dividends. According to a recent survey of wealth
management experts, more than half of the respondents said they should raise their dividend
pressure levels above current levels. In addition, among some companies, dividends are
considered to be effective in improving corporate image and investment, and companies are
expected to participate in additional dividends.
In the meantime, Korean companies have been criticized by shareholders for their low-
dividend payout ratio. In 2017, the global dividend yield is 2.48%, 2.46% in advanced econo-
mies, and 2.6% in emerging economies. However, in Korea, the average dividend yield of 522
companies, which made cash dividends in December 2016, is only 1.8%. According to market
researcher Thomson Reuters, Korean listed companies’ dividend levels in the first half of 2016
were 16th among 17 major countries. It has been pointed out that the dubious propensity of
Korean companies to pay dividends in the global market hinders investment sentiment in the
Korean market, resulting in “Korea discount.” Under this circumstance, dividend pressure of
the NPS contributes to resolving Korea discounts and realizes the high value of shareholder
return through active voting rights and shareholder rights exercises.
Moreover, the top 30 of Korean companies recorded the highest surplus in 2017. In the case of
firms with high free cash flow, it is known that active cash distribution is favorable for
shareholders because it can suppress managerial pursuit of private interests and enhance the
monitoring function of capital markets [1, 2]. In this situation, the increase of the dividend of
Korean companies can contribute to reducing the agency cost and strengthening the distribu-
tion function of profit. In addition, in the prolonged low-interest-rate framework, firms’
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dividend increases can transform investors who have made short-term investments into long-
term investors, which can increase the investment assets of companies and create jobs through
investment.
On the other hand, there are opinions that it is not appropriate for the NPS to exercise dividend
pressure with the voting rights as a weapon when management risks are high due to its
opaque management environment. Determination of the dividend rate is one of the core
management decisions of the enterprise. If the NPS directly demands the high dividend,
companies will be severely constrained by financial strategy. At present, the investment ten-
dency of Korean companies is considerably high compared with developed countries, and
facility investment has also slowed down during the financial crisis but has steadily increased
since 2002. Therefore, the increase of corporate dividend by NPS can reduce the entrepreneur-
ial motivation of companies and lead to decrease of firm value.
In addition, the industrial structure of Korea is highly composed of industries with low
dividend payout such as IT, automobile, and industrial goods, while the ratio of industries
with high dividend payout such as finance, utility, and consumer goods is relatively low. Since
the industrial structure is very sensitive to the global economy compared to developed coun-
tries with high dividend payout ratio, simple comparison of dividend payout ratio between
countries may not be appropriate. Also, if free cash flow is cash dividend payable, other
companies except the top 10 Chaebol group’s companies cannot afford dividends. Therefore,
it is unreasonable for the pension fund to make long-term investment decisions to pursue
short-term high returns by high dividends.
While the expectation and concern about the dividend pressure of the NPS coexist, we examine
whether the dividend increase of Korean companies due to ask of NPS has an effect on the firm
value. Specifically, firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q, and the dividend pressure of the NPS
is measured through the intersection of the NPS’s more than 5% stake and the dividend level.
Most of the results show that NPS’s dividend pressure does not have a significant effect on
firm value. However, it is confirmed that there is a significant positive relation between
dividend level and firm value. In other words, Korean listed companies may consider increas-
ing dividends as one of the ways to increase corporate value. In addition, firms with large
shareholdings of NPS tend to have high corporate value. This implies that the expansion of the
investment of the NPS to domestic enterprises improves the corporate value and the improved
corporate value results in the better performance of the NPS, the largest shareholder, that is, a
virtuous cycle structure is established. On the other hand, NPS dividend pressure has a
negative effect on firm value in some analyzes after controlling endogeneity and heterogeneity,
however, this is not the result of consistency in all analyses, so it is appropriate to generalize it
through further studies in the future.
The contribution of this study is as follows. First, I examine the relationship between corporate
dividend policy and firm value. The previous study focused on verifying the relationship
between firm value and dividend policy determined by the firm itself. On the other hand, this
study examines the relationship between corporate value and dividend policy based on the
demand of NPS rather than voluntary decisions by companies. I have noted the special
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situation in Korea that pension funds can actively participate in the corporate dividend policy
of their own country. The two-way causality between the dividend policy and the corporate
value, which is a limitation of the existing research, is solved by the external pressure of the
demand for the NPS.
Second, this study measures the main verification variables as the dividend level of a firm with
a large share of the national pension. I tried to derive a more accurate empirical result by
correcting the possible self-selection bias using propensity score matching (PSM). Also, I
present the result of calibrating endogenous and heteroscedasticity using fixed-effect panel
analysis and 2-stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS) for matched samples using PSM
to mitigate self-selection bias.
Finally, the results of this study confirm that Korean companies have a positive relationship
between dividend level and firm value. In addition, the fact that the NPS has a large share of
corporate ownership has a positive effect on corporate value. Most of my results show that the
dividend pressure of the national pension is not related to the enterprise value. However, when
using 2SLS to control endogeneity, it is confirmed that thedividendpressure of the national pension
has a negative effect on corporate value. The results of this study are expected to provide useful
information for business executives related to corporate dividend policy or for voting right of NPS.
2. Preliminary research and hypothesis setting
2.1. The relationship between dividend and firm value
The study of the relationship between dividend and firm value has been a major research topic
in finance and accounting for a long time. In this section, we introduce the major hypotheses
that explain the relationship between dividend and firm value, such as free cash flow hypoth-
esis, dividend clientele hypothesis, and dividend catering hypothesis.
First, the free cash flow hypothesis argues that dividend has the effect of decreasing free cash
flow and alleviating the agency problem, thereby increasing firm value. In other words, the
surplus cash flow hypothesis predicts the positive relationship between dividend and firm
value. Ref. [3] shows that there is a positive relationship between dividend and firm value, and
this relationship is stronger in countries where investor protection is weak. Ref. [4] finds that
there is a positive relationship between dividend and firm value. They interpreted the scale of
dividend as having the ability to predict future profit in the context of the signal effect
hypothesis of dividend.
Second, dividend clientele hypothesis does not predict the monotonic direction of the relation-
ship between dividend and firm value. In this hypothesis, investor groups have diverse prefer-
ences and decide dividend policy to satisfy this preference. Ref. [5] argued that investors with
high marginal tax rates tended to construct portfolios based on stocks with low dividend yields.
Refs. [6, 7] found that the effect of dividend size change disclosure on share price is greater for
firms with higher dividend yields, suggesting the existence of a group of preferred investors.
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According to the dividend catering hypothesis proposed by Ref. [8], the relationship between
dividend and firm value is time varying that is not stable. Company’s dividend policy depends
on how the market value of a company that paid dividends is evaluated compared to a
company that does not pay. They first define the dividend premium as the difference in
average market value between the companies that pay dividends and those that do not, and
then find that many companies pay dividends in the year with a positive dividend premium,
and that many firms omit dividends in negative years. Thus, according to this hypothesis,
dividend and firm value are in a time-varying relationship with positive or negative relations
depending on the year.
2.2. Hypothesis setting
Ref. [9] compares the accounting characteristics of firms with large shareholdings of NPS to
those that do not. Companies with a large share of the NPS are found to have higher profits
and growth potentials and lower PERs than those that do not. In the case of stability, the ratio
of debt to equity is reduced after the NPS has acquired a large amount of stake, suggesting that
the NPS requires improvement of the financial structure of the enterprise. Companies with a
large share of the NPS have lower payout ratio than those that do not, which supports the
government’s claim that it should strengthen the voting power of the NPS in relation to
dividends.
Dividend payout ratio of corporate Korea is the lowest level in the major economies, and low
payout ratio results in a “Korea discount” to undermine investor sentiment in South Korea
companies in the global market. Moreover, recently, listed companies of major Chaebol groups
in Korea have the highest level of reserve in history. In the case of firms with high free cash
flow, it is known that active cash distribution is favorable for shareholders because it can
suppress managerial pursuit of private interests and enhance the monitoring function of
capital markets [1, 2]. In this context, the dividend pressure of the national pension can
contribute to reducing the Korea discount, reducing the agency cost and strengthening the
distribution function of profit. In addition, in the prolonged low-interest-rate framework,
firms’ dividends increase their investment assets by converting investors who have made
short-term investments into long-term investors and the effect of job creation by expanding
investment can be expected. In other words, aggressive voting rights for the expansion of the
NPS can be expected to result in the elimination of the Korea discount, the reduction of agency
costs, and the creation of jobs through investment expansion.
On the other hand, it is not right for the NPS to participate in the dividend policy, which is one
of the key decision-makings of companies. If the NPS directly demands a high dividend,
companies will be severely constrained by capital management plans. The dividend pressure
of the NPS may help to improve short-term profitability, but it does not know how it will affect
corporate value in the long run. Focusing on short-term profits is not consistent with NPS’s
intentions, namely, its responsibility to the old age and future of the people. Currently, the
investment level of Korean companies is considerably higher than that of developed countries,
and the proportion of consumer discretionary and industrial materials such as IT and automo-
biles, which have a low dividend payout ratio, is high among all industries. Therefore, an
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increase in dividends due to the external pressure of NPS may reduce the investment motiva-
tion of companies, leading to a decrease in investment, which may adversely affect the firm
value. While the opposite effect of NPS dividend pressure is expected, we will examine how
the dividend pressure of NPS affects the firm.
3. Research design
3.1. Definition of variables
In this study, Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of firm value. Tobin’s Q is the market value of
assets divided by the replacement cost. The higher the value, the higher the firm value because
the market value of the enterprise is evaluated higher than the replacement cost in the market.
The market value of assets is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book
value of debt, and the replacement cost is calculated as the book value of the asset.
Dividend pressure of NPS is measured by the following method. First, because NPS does not
directly disclose a list of low dividend companies, it uses the level of cash dividend and
whether or not NPS owns more than 5% stake because it sees a baseline stake, typically 5%,
that can control management and influence the company. In addition, in Korea, it is obligatory
to report related contents when holding more than 5% of the shares of a listed corporation, so
information on the proportion of NPS’s investment can be obtained. We consider the dummy
variable (NPF) which distinguishes the cases where NPS has more than 5% stake. The divi-
dend level is measured by cash dividend to total asset ratio (DIVTA), cash dividend to net
income ratio (DIVOUT), and cash dividend to paid-in capital ratio (DIVRATE). In addition, if a
company with a high NPS stake increases its cash dividend level in the following period, it is
highly likely that NPS has given dividend pressure to the company. Therefore, we also con-
sider the change variable of the dividend levels (Δ DIVTA, Δ DIVOUT, Δ DIVRATE). In this
chapter, we use the intersection term between the dividend level variables (DIVTA, DIVOUT,
DIVRATE, ΔDIVTA, ΔDIVOUT, ΔDIVRATE, and the dummy variable (NPS)) to measure the
probability of NPS dividend pressure.
3.2. Research model
In this study, the dividend pressure of NPS is measured using whether NPS invests in equity of
5% or more. Therefore, the nature of a company that NPS has invested in a large amount can
affect the outcome. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to control self-selection bias. PSM
has the advantage of reducing the impact of certain variables and providing more accurate
statistics when analyzing groups [10]. Ref. [9] found some accounting variables that signifi-
cantly differed between firms with large shareholdings in NPS and those without. These vari-
ables are profitability (ROA), debt ratio (LEV), price-earnings ratio (PER), net income growth
rate (NIR), dividend payout ratio (DIVOUT), and market. Therefore, in this study, PSM is
performed using these variables. The concrete model is as follows.
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First logistics model for propensity score matching:
NPFi, t ¼ β0 þ β1LEV i, t þ β2ROAi, t þ β3NIRi, t þ β4Marketi, t þ β5PERi, t þ β6DIVOUTi, t þ Ei, t
(1)
NPF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if NPS owns more than 5% of the company’s stake and 0
otherwise. LEV is debt ratio andROA is net income divided by average total assets. NIR is growth
rate of net income.Market is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is listed on the KOSPI
and 0 otherwise. PER is price-earnings ratio andDIVOUT is cash dividend divided by net income.
In order to analyze the effect of NPS’s dividend pressure on firm value, we analyze the follow-
ing equation, Eq. (2), using the sample matched in Eq. (1).
Second OLS regression model for main analysis:
Qi, t ¼ β0 þ β1DIV i, t þ β2DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1 þ β3NPFi, t1 þ
X
βi iControlsi, t1 (2)
Q is Tobin’s Q, which measures firm value. DIV is the dividend level of the company, mea-
sured by DIVTA, DIVOUT, DIVRATE, ΔDIVTA, ΔDIVOUT, and ΔDIVRATE. The main inter-
est variable of this study is the cross-section of Eq. (2), which is the variable indicating the
dividend pressure of NPS. If β2 has a statistically significant positive (+) value, then NPS’s
dividend pressure will increase the firm value. On the other hand, if β2 has a statistically
significant negative () value, the dividend pressure of NPS would decrease the firm value.
We use variables that are known to affect investment in previous studies as control variables
[11, 12]. Since the firm size and profitability affect investment, SIZE, which takes natural
logarithm of total assets, and ROA, which shows profitability, are used as control variables. In
the case of firms with high debt ratios, investment activity decreases due to the high bank-
ruptcy risk [13]. We use LEV, which represents the debt ratio and Z, which measures the
bankruptcy risk by Altman’s Z-score. We use CFO, which divides cash flow from operating
activities into total assets, and TANG, which divides the tangible assets into total assets, LOSS,
which means net loss. We use MB, which is the market-to-book value ratio of equity,
OPCYLCE, which takes natural logarithm of operating cycle, and volatility (STD_CFO,
STD_SALES) as control variables.
3.3. Sample selection
The sample in this study is all companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 2011 to
2016 which meet the following criteria.
1. non-financial companies.
2. excluding companies with negative net assets.
3. companies with more than 5% shares of NPS and controlled groups matched using PSM.
4. companies that can obtain relevant financial information from data guide.
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Of the original 11,350 firm-year observations from 2011 to 2016, we lose 616 for financial
companies and 182 for companies with negative net assets. 1039 observations are companies
that have more than 5% shares of NPS and the control group matched using PSM has 2978
observations. In order to exclude the effect of extreme values, 1% of the upper and lower
values are winsorized. The final company-year observations, including all financial informa-
tion required for the analysis, are identified as 2194.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Panel A of Table 1 shows the yearly distribution and ownership percentage of companies with
NPS shares of more than 5%. In 2000, NPS had more than 5% shares of only one company but
it has increased gradually since then and has increased sharply since the 2008 financial crisis.
In 2016, NPS owns more than 5% stake in 231 Korean companies with an average stake of
8.46%, with a maximum stake of 13. 5%. Panel B provides yearly statements on NPS’s objec-
tions to the shareholders’ meeting at the shareholders’ meeting for reasons of lower dividend.
NPS’s voting rights were manually extracted from the NPS fund management website since
2005. The number of cases in which NPS exercised its voting rights on the grounds of a lower
dividend was only 1 or 2 before 2010 but soared to 16 in 2011, again dropping to 26 in 2014.
This seems to be due to the revision of the Enforcement Decree of the Capital Markets Act at
the end of 2014 and the legal basis for NPS to invest in the company.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Panel A is for a test
sample that matches 1: 2 PSM to companies with NPS’s over 5% stake (treated group) and to
those whose does not (control group). We use this sample to verify the effect of NPS dividend
pressure on firm value. The mean value of Q is 1.37 and the median is 1.01. The top 1% of Q is
6.57, indicating that some of the firms in the test sample have a very high Q value. Since the
treated group and the control group are matched 1: 2, the NPF has a value of 1 from the 75th
percentile. In observations that account for about 2% of the test sample, NPS’s have exercised a
negative voting right at the shareholders’ meeting for reasons of low dividend. Panel B pro-
vides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the logistic regression analysis for PSM.
Panel A is descriptive statistics of the test sample constructed through PSM, but Panel B is for
the entire sample. Korea’s listed companies have an average debt ratio of 44% from 2011 to
2016, ROA of 1%, and net profit growth of negative values. The average PER is 14.8x and the
average dividend payout ratio is 12. 5%. Table 3 shows the result of Pearson correlation
analysis. Q has a positive correlation with NPF. The correlation between Q and the variables
representing the dividend level is inconsistent. However, the correlation does not take into
account other factors that affect the relationship between the two variables. It is more appro-
priate to draw conclusions through the regression analysis described below.
Panel A of the table is descriptive statistics of variables used in main analysis and Panel B is
descriptive statistics of variables used in logistic regression analysis for PSM. Q is Tobin’s
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which means firm, and NPF is a dummy variable indicating whether the NPS owns more than
5% stake. DIVOUT is the cash dividend rate relative to the net income, DIVTA is the cash
dividend rate relative to total assets, and DIVRATE is the cash dividend rate relative to the
paid-in capital. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the debt ratio, ROA is the returns
on assets, CFO is the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets, and σ (CF) and σ (SALES) is
volatility. Z is the risk of bankruptcy of Altman’s Z-score, OPCYCLE is the natural log of the
operating cycle, MB is the market-to-the-book value ratio of equity, TANG is the ratio of
tangible assets to total assets, and LOSS is 1 if the company has net loss otherwise 0. In Panel
B, NIR is the growth rate of net income, PER is the ratio of stock price to EPS, and the rest is the
same as Panel A definition.
The definitions of the variables are the same as those in Table 2.
Panel A: Annual distribution of companies with NPS of more than 5% shares
Year n Ownership owned by NPS
Mean Min Median Max
2000 1 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47
2001 4 6.78 5.37 6.56 8.63
2002 4 7.01 5.37 6.89 8.89
2003 12 6.46 5.04 6.23 8.75
2004 18 7.56 5.18 6.89 12.21
2005 19 8.16 5.73 8.20 11.28
2006 29 7.53 5.02 6.35 15.67
2007 30 7.65 5.06 6.60 15.81
2008 53 7.61 5.01 6.71 15.73
2009 65 6.67 5.01 6.40 12.20
2010 97 6.65 5.00 6.30 9.66
2011 117 7.55 5.00 7.50 11.02
2012 159 7.66 5.02 7.89 11.08
2013 195 8.01 5.03 7.71 13.41
2014 210 8.35 5.00 8. 10 14.82
2015 225 8.65 5.00 8.06 14.20
2016 231 8.46 5.00 8.04 13.50
Panel B: Number of companies for which NPS exercised a negative voting right at the shareholders’ meeting due to a
lower dividend
Year 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Obs 2 1 1 18 1 7 26 16 21 18
Table 1. Distribution of NPS shares (5% or more) and voting exercise (reason for less dividend).
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4.2. Results of PSM and OLS regression
Table 4 shows the results of Eq. (1), a logistic regression for PSM. The dependent variable of
the logistic regression model is whether NPS owns more than 5% stake. We used LEV (debt
ratio), ROA (return on assets), NIR (growth rate of net income), market (KOSPI or KOSDAQ),
PER, and DIVOUT (dividend payout) and yearly dummy as independent variables. The
results show that debt ratio, ROA, market, and dividend payout are related to whether NPS
owns a large amount of stakes. However, net income growth and PER are not related to NPS
Type n mean std a1 a25 a50 a75 a99
Panel A: descriptive statistics for main analysis
Q 3105 1.37 1.37 0.39 0.81 1.03 1.44 6.57
NPF 3117 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Divout 3117 20.52 26.64 29.98 2.82 14.19 27.59 125.05
∆ Divout 3117 3.37 34.41 143.57 2.36 0.00 6.06 134.10
Divta 3117 0.92 1.15 0.00 0.17 0.58 1.22 6.91
∆ Divta 3090 0.01 0.64 2.15 0.10 0.00 0.09 2.69
Divrate 3117 0.26 0.34 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.32 1.50
∆ Divrate 3117 0.02 0.12 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.50
D_LOW 3117 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
SIZE 3117 26.94 1.63 23.91 25.78 26.72 27.82 31.34
LEV 3117 0.44 0.19 0.07 0.28 0.44 0.59 0.88
ROA 3117 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.30
CFO 3117 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.37
σ(CFO) 2947 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.30
σ(SALES) 2947 0.22 0.26 0.01 0.08 0. 14 0.26 1.50
Z 3021 3.53 2.98 0.27 1.89 2.75 4.17 17.53
OPCYCLE 2681 4.56 0.60 2.58 4.24 4.63 4.93 5.83
MB 3022 1.44 3.14 0.06 0.57 0.92 1.51 9.07
TANG 3026 0.33 0.18 0.01 0.20 0.33 0.45 0.80
LOSS 3026 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Panel B: descriptive statistics of logistic model for PSM
LEV 10,552 0.44 0.21 0.05 0.27 0.44 0.60 0.92
ROA 10,482 0.01 0.12 0.48 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.26
NIR 10,480 0.39 4.67 26.93 0.84 0.17 0.38 16.78
PER 10,223 14.80 106.96 240.76 2.79 8.42 19.17 442.48
DIVOUT 10,550 12.50 23.63 31.82 0.00 0.00 18.46 125.05
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
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holdings more than 5% stake. Panel B shows the results of the PSM, with 1039 observations of
firm-year observations that have more than 5% stake in NPS, with 1:2 matching and 2078
controls.
Table 5 shows the results of OLS regression analysis of Eq. (2) that analyzed the effect of NPS’s
dividend pressure on firm value. The dividend pressure of NPS is measured by the intersec-
tion term (DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1) between the level of cash dividend and whether the NPS invested
more than 5%. Columns (1)–(6) show different definitions of cash dividend level, respectively.
First, the relationship between cash dividend level (DIV) and firm value has a statistically
significant positive value in columns (3), (4), (5), and (6). This suggests that Korean firms tend
to have higher firm value as cash dividends are paid more. In addition, in the columns (1), (2),
(3), (4), and (5), it is confirmed that the NPF has a statistically significant positive value with
the enterprise value. This indicates that a firm with more than 5% stake in NPS has a higher
enterprise value. However, the DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1 variable, which indicates the dividend pressure
of the NPS, is not significantly related to firm value. To summarize, the dividend pressure of
the NPS does not directly affect firm value. However, it has been shown that the holding of
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Q 1.00
(2) NPF 0.06 1.00
(3) DIVOUT 0.06 0.01 1.00
(4) ΔDIVOUT 0.02 0.03 0.59 1.00
(5) DIVTA 0.29 0.05 0.39 0.07 1.00
(6) ΔDIVTA 0. 13 0.02 0.06 0. 12 0.27 1.00
(7) DIVRATE 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.03 0.61 0. 13 1.00
(8) ΔDIVRATE 0.22 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.34 0.67 0.44 1.00
(9) SIZE 0. 10 0.46 0.01 0.00 0. 11 0.04 0.24 0.06 1.00
(10) LEV 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.33 1.00
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(11) Q 1.00
(12) ROA 0.15 1.00
(13) CFO 0.15 0.47 1.00
(14) σ CFOð Þ 0.24 0.08 0.02 1.00
(15) σ SALESð Þ 0. 11 0.02 0.02 0.48 1.00
(16) Z 0.43 0.42 0.29 0.15 0.02 1.00
(17) OPCYCLE 0. 11 0. 14 0.22 0.05 0. 13 0. 11 1.00
(18) MB 0.24 0. 14 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 1.00
(19) TANG 0. 12 0. 10 0.07 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.01 0.02 1.00
(20) LOSS 0.02 0.59 0.26 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.07 0. 10 0.04 1.00
Table 3. Pearson correlation.
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large stakes by the NPS positively affects corporate value. There is also a significant relation
between dividend levels and firm value. This suggests that if listed companies in Korea are
able to pay dividends, raising dividend levels can be a way to increase corporate value.
In robustness analysis, 2SLS and fixed-effect panel analysis are applied to control endogeneity
and heterogeneity problems. Tables 6 and 7 are estimated by fixed-effect panel analysis on
unbalanced panel data and control industrial effects. In order to control endogeneity, 2SLS
estimates the endogenous variables using the instrument variables in the first step. The main
test variable of this study is DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1 which is composed of the intersection of two
variables, and the endogenous variable is DIV i, t. According to the previous study [14], the
endogeneity of the cross term (DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1) is not simply corrected by the intersection term
of DIV i, t estimated in the first step and NPFi, t1. In the first step, not only DIV i, t but also
DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1 are estimated together and the estimated variables of the two variables
(DIV i, t, DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1 ) are input in the second step. In this study, I use the dividend level of
previous year (DIV i, t1) as an appropriate instrument variable for the current dividend level
(DIV i, t). This is because the dividend level of the previous year is not a direct causal
Panel A: The results of logistic regression for PSM:
NPFi,t ¼ β0 þ β1LEV i, t þ β2ROAi, t þ β3NIRi, t þ β4Marketi, t þ β5PERi, t þ β6DIVOUT i,t
Parameter Estimate Wald Chi2 P-value
Intercept 0.30 2.45 0. 12
LEV 0.53*** 7.44 0.01
ROA 7.31*** 185.81 <.0001
NIR 0.01 0.50 0.48
Market 2.22*** 626.78 <.0001
PER 0.00 1.54 0.21
DIVOUT 0.01*** 17.08 <.0001
Year dummy Included
Panel B: The result of PSM
Difference statistic Propensity Score
Method Optimal Variable Ratio Matching
Min Control/Treated Ratio 1
Max Control/Treated Ratio 3
Matched Sets 1039
Matched Obs. (Treated) 1039
Matched Obs. (Control) 2078
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of the variables are
the same as those in Table 2.
Table 4. Results for logistic regression for PSM.
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Var. (1) DIVOUT (2) ΔDIVOUT (3) DIVTA (4) ΔDIVTA (5) DIVRATE (6) ΔDIVRATE
Intercept 1.66*** 1.65*** 1.12*** 1.57*** 2.66*** 1.96***
(2.43) 2.41 1.80 2.33 3.87 2.92
DIV i, t 0.00 0.00 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.71*** 1.99***
(1.74) 0.41 9.72 7.00 7.08 8.77
DIV i, t∗NPFi, t1 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.39
(0.04) 0.25 1.42 1.63 1.24 1.09
NPFi, t1 0.14** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0. 14
(2.06) 2.53 2.66 2.61 2.47 2.41
SIZEi, t1 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.10***
(4.76) 13.90 4.55 4.72 7.19 5.46
LEV i, t1 2.16*** 2.19*** 2.38*** 2.23*** 2.40*** 2.20***
(13.62) 13.90 15.28 14.37 15.26 14.25
ROAi, t1 1.13*** 1.27*** 0.48 1.47*** 0.78 1.22***
(2.42) 2.67 1.03 3.16 1.67 2.66
CFOi, t1 0.18*** 0.82*** 0.06** 0.79*** 0.62** 0.62**
(2.63) 2.66 1.97 2.62 2.05 2.04
σ CFð Þi, t1 3.35*** 3.37*** 3.45*** 3.31*** 3.25*** 3.21***
(7.60) 7.65 7.99 7.61 7.47 7.42
σ SALESð Þi, t1 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03
(1.25) 0.37 0.17 0.57 0. 14 0.35
Zi, t1 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.21***
(20.91) 20.91 18.72 21.61 19.56 20.98
OPCYCLEi, t1 0.09* 0.09* 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07
(1.81) 1.84 1.17 1.58 1.40 1.52
MBi, t1 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(4.24) 4.25 4.18 4.41 4.15 4.24
TANGi, t1 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08
(0.42) 0.37 0.41 0.48 0.36 0.53
LOSSi, t1 0. 13 0.18** 0.15** 0. 14 0.15 0.12
(1.62) 2. 13 1.97 1.81 1.92 1.58
Adj.R2 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35
Year/industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included
Obs. 2615 2615 2615 2615 2615 2615
The upper part of each cell represents the estimation coefficient and the lower part represents the t value. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of the variables are the same as those in
Table 2.
Table 5. The effect of dividend pressure of NPS on firm value: main analysis.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st step 2nd step 1st step 2nd step




dDIV i, t∗NPFi, t1
0.06** 0.06
(2.55) (0.83)
NPFi, t1 0.07 0.23*** 0.07** 0.08 0.03 0.01
(1.41) (7.74) (2.54) (1.48) (1.25) (0.34)
SIZEi, t1 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.44*** 0.17*** 0.07*
(2.85) (4.48) (3.75) (4.65) (3.70) (1.86)
LEV i, t1 0.91*** 0.30** 0.44*** 1.12*** 0.40*** 0.29***
(3.56) (2.00) (3.52) (3.49) (2.60) (2.69)
ROAi, t1 0.24 0.01 0.13 1.24*** 0.37* 0.17
(0.73) (0.03) (0.87) (2.99) (1.85) (1. 12)
CFOi, t1 0.20 0.15 0.04 0.96*** 0.24* 0. 14
(1.00) (1.27) (0.48) (3.80) (1.94) (1.51)
σ CFð Þi, t1 0.56 0.41* 0.01 0.65 0.43* 0. 12
(1.36) (1.66) (0.06) (1.25) (1.70) (0.70)
σ SALESð Þi, t1 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06
(0.73) (0.31) (1.56) (0.21) (0.78) (1.48)
Zi, t1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01*
(0.62) (0.87) (1.58) (0.70) (1.26) (1.68)
OPCYCLEi, t1 0.17*** 0.10** 0.04 0.07 0.09** 0.02
(2.60) (2.44) (1.04) (0.89) (2.31) (0.59)
MBi, t1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.39) (0.91) (0.58) (1.20) (1.04) (0.18)
TANGi, t1 0.90*** 0.19 1.09*** 0.54 0. 12 0.97***
(3.30) (1.17) (7.95) (1.56) (0.73) (8.59)
LOSSi, t1 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04
(0.47) (0.71) (1.64) (0.30) (0.03) (1.60)
DIV i, t1 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.27*** 0.01
(6. 11) (5.56) (11.06) (0.56)
DIV i, t1∗NPFi, t1 0.05 0.83 0.10* 0.33***
(1.64) (47.37) (1.72) (12.35)
Adj.R) 0.09 0.76 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.1
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st step 2nd step 1st step 2nd step
DIVTAi, t DIVTAi,t∗NPFi, t1 Qi, t ∆DIVTAi,t ∆DIVTAi, t∗NPFi, t1 Qi, t
# of obs 2631 2631 2194 2631 2631 2194
# of groups 1215 1215 1027 1215 1215 1027
F-statistics 9.36*** 313.46*** 9.28*** 22.67*** 18.21*** 9.22***
The upper part of each cell represents the estimation coefficient and the lower part represents the t value. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of the variables are the same as
those in Table 2.
Table 6. Robustness test using 2SLS and panel analysis (1).
Variable (1) DIVOUT (2) ΔDIVOUT (3) DIVRATE (4) ΔDIVRATE
dDIV i, t
0.00 0.00 0.23 0.19
(1.20) (0.69) (1.11) (0.84)
dDIV i, t∗NPFi, t1
0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.06
(1.79) (0.35) (0.04) (0.08)
NPFi, t1 0.36* 0.01 0.02 0.01
(1.86) (0.70) (0.75) (0.32)
SIZEi, t1 0.03 0.10*** 0.08* 0.11***
(0.37) (3.11) (1.86) (2.81)
LEV i, t1 0.69*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.36***
(3.05) (3.54) (3.68) (3.32)
ROAi, t1 0.24 0.12 0.08 0. 11
(1.37) (0.75) (0.55) (0.76)
CFOi, t1 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07
(0.49) (0.63) (0.88) (0.80)
σ CFð Þi, t1 -0. 10 0.06 0.04 0.08
(0.50) (0.35) (0.20) (0.49)
σ SALESð Þi, t1 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.51) (1.23) (1.38) (1.30)
Zi, t1 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.01
(2.39) (1.77) (1.67) (1.51)
OPCYCLEi, t1 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.01
(1.56) (0.34) (0.76) (0.31)
MBi, t1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.30) (0.25) (0.35) (0.26)
Ask of National Pension Service for Higher Dividend and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75578
67
relationship with the current corporate value but is a variable that determines the present
dividend level [15, 16].
First, columns (1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6) in Table 6 are the result of using DIVTA and
nDIVTA as DIV variables, respectively. Column (1) and (2) are to estimate DIVTA and DIVTA
* NPF as the first steps for 2SLS, and (3) columns show the main analysis results using the
variables estimated in columns (1) and (2). Similarly, columns (4) and (5) are to estimate mns
(analysis results using the variables estimated in columns (6) is about main analysis. The results
of the first stage, column (1) and (2), show that the dividend level of the previous period has a
significant positive relationship with the dividend level of the current period at 1% level. In the
second step, in contrast to the results in Table 5, the level of dividends does not affect the firm
value. On the other hand, the dividend pressure of NPS has a negative effect on the corporate
value. The results of column (6) using the variables of dividends does not affect the firm value.
On the other hand, the dividend pressure of NPS has a negative effect on the corporate
Table 7 shows the results of the same analysis as Table 6 using the remaining DIV variables.
Columns (1)–(4) are the second stages of 2SLS, and definition of DIV variable is different. Only
in column (1), where dividend levels are measured by DIVOUT, the dividend pressure of the
NPS has been found to have a negative impact on corporate value at the 10% level. However,
in the case of the remaining variables, NPS’s dividend pressure and corporate value are not
related. Dividend level of the current period can be determined endogenously, but it is difficult
to find a precedent study that mentions the problem of endogeneity on the change of the
dividend level. In the case of changes in the level of dividends, I do not use 2SLS and applied
only fixed-effect panel analysis. Although it is not shown in the table, the dividend pressure of
the NPS is not related to firm value. In conclusion, in a few analyses, the dividend pressure of
the NPS is found to be negative for firm value. However, in order to generalize this, the
evidence of empirical analysis is lacking. In this study, I conclude that the dividend pressure
of the NPS is irrelevant to firm value.
Variable (1) DIVOUT (2) ΔDIVOUT (3) DIVRATE (4) ΔDIVRATE
TANGi, t1 1.06*** 0.99*** 1.03*** 0.97***
(8.75) (8.76) (8.64) (7.36)
LOSSi, t1 0.12** 0.05* 0.04 0.03
(2.18) (1.68) (1.58) (1.41)
Adj.R2 0.10 0. 10 0.10 0.10
# of obs 2194 2194 2194 2194
# of groups 1027 1027 1027 1027
F-statistics 8.98*** 8.76*** 8.83*** 8.81***
The upper part of each cell represents the estimation coefficient and the lower part represents the t value. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of the variables are the same as
those in Table 2.
Table 7. Robustness test using 2SLS and panel analysis (2).
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5. Conclusion
This study investigated the effect of NPS dividend pressure on firm value. For the purpose of this
study, we analyzed the Korean listed companies from 2011 to 2016. The dividend pressure of
NPS was measured by using the intersection of the cash dividend level and whether or not NPS
had a large amount of share. The level of cash dividend was measured by cash dividend rate
relative to total assets, net income, and capital. The change variables of these variables were also
considered. We constructed the test sample using PSM to reduce the self-selection bias.
The results show that the dividend pressure of NPS had no significant effect on firm value.
However, there was a significant relation between dividend level and firm value. In addition,
firmswith large shareholdings of the NPS tended to have high corporate value. As a result, listed
companies in Korea could consider increasing dividends as one of the ways to increase corporate
value. This study is expected to provide useful information for future decision-making regarding
voting rights related to dividends. It will also help guide the dividend policy of companies that
are receiving investment from NPS. In recent years, as Korean corporations have increased their
reserves, this research is expected to provide useful information to investors and managers who
are interested in possible agency problems. This chapter analyzes the impact of cash dividend on
corporate value using the external shock of NPS’s dividend expansion pressure. Most of the
previous studies have analyzed dividend and investment on the same line and analyzed the
effect of these factors on firm value. This study solves the problem of bidirectional causality
between dividend and firm value by using exogenous factors such as NPS’s dividend pressure.
As a result, the dividend pressure of the NPS does not have a significant effect on firm value.
On the other hand, there is a significant positive relation between dividend level and firm
value and whether mass ownership of NPS has a significant positive effect on firm value. This
study is meaningful to verify the direct effect of pension funds on behaviorism. In addition,
this study has contributed to verifying the direct effect of corporate dividend increase on firm
value using the external shock of NPS’s dividend pressure.
This study has the following limitations. First, the proxy of the NPSon firm value. This study is
meaningful to verify the direct effect of pension funds on behavior holdings of NPS and the
cash dividend level. If a company with a large amount of the NPS pays a large dividend, it is
difficult to distinguish whether the corporation voluntarily increases the dividend or increases
the dividend by the pressure of the national pension. The solution to these limitations is to be
handled in future research.
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